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ABSTRACT
Since statehood, Alaska’s Constitution has included the right of the people to
enact legislative change by direct democracy. The state’s initiative process as
governed by the Alaska Constitution, statutes, and caselaw reflects a delicate
balance of citizen participation within carefully crafted guardrails meant to
ensure the efficacy of the process and the role of the legislature. Alaska courts
have developed a still-evolving body of caselaw interpreting the restrictions on
the subject and scope of ballot initiatives, the role of the executive and judicial
branches in the initiative process, and the timing and procedural features of the
process. Navigating the initiative process can be expensive and arduous, and
can involve difficult legal judgments by the courts, the petitioners, and the
executive branch. For decades Alaskans have managed to do just that, and
direct democracy has proved to be an important tool for advancing the people’s
interests when they fail to garner attention or support in the legislature. This
piece reviews the history of direct democracy in the Alaska Constitution and
the law on Alaska’s ballot initiative process as it currently stands, including
important recent updates.

I. INTRODUCTION
Alaska is one of twenty-one states that permits some form of direct
democracy through ballot initiative, allowing citizens to propose and
enact laws at elections as an alternative to legislative enactments.1 Since
Copyright © 2020 by Elizabeth M. Bakalar.
* J.D. Brooklyn Law School (2005); B.A. Brown University (1999); Elizabeth
(Libby) Bakalar has practiced law in Alaska since 2006, representing both public
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at the State of Alaska, Department of Law.
1. See Initiative and Referendum States, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/chart-of-the-
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statehood, over fifty initiative measures have been presented to Alaskan
voters,2 with many more that ultimately failed to reach the ballot for
various reasons.3 Because initiatives often deal with controversial
subjects, they are frequently litigated. The Alaska Supreme Court (the
Court) has developed a vast body of caselaw in this area that helps guide
election law practitioners and initiative sponsors. The ballot initiative has
proven an effective—if at times cumbersome and costly—means for
Alaskans to enact laws when their elected officials have been unable or
unwilling to do so through the regular legislative process.
This Article explores and explains Alaska’s ballot initiative in four
parts. Part II describes the constitutional origins of Alaska’s ballot
initiative process. Part III delves into the constitutional requirements and
restrictions governing the ballot initiative and the Court’s long line of
caselaw interpreting those requirements and restrictions. Part IV explains
various standards employed by the judiciary and rights preserved to the
legislature when confronting ballot measures. Finally, Part V walks
through the statutory process for proposing and enacting statewide ballot
measures. The Article concludes that although Alaska’s ballot measure
process can be daunting, difficult, and costly for ballot measure
petitioners or sponsors, it is largely effective at preserving Alaskans’ right
to direct democracy, which the authors of the Alaska Constitution
believed was one of the people’s fundamental rights.4

II. CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE BALLOT INITIATIVE IN
ALASKA
A.

The Delegates’ Vision of the Ballot Initiative and Historical
Context

On November 8, 1955, three years before statehood, fifty-five
delegates to the Alaska Constitutional Convention gathered at the
University of Alaska in Fairbanks to draft the Alaska Constitution.5
initiative-states.aspx (last visited Sept. 6, 2020) (listing states with initiative or
referendum processes). For purposes of this Article, the terms “ballot measure,”
“measure,” “ballot initiative,” and “initiative” are used interchangeably.
2. See Initiative History, STATE OF ALASKA DIV. OF ELECTIONS 1–3 (June 24,
2019) http://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/forms/H26.pdf#page=1
(cataloguing the history of initiatives that have appeared on ballots in Alaska).
3. See id. at 4–13 (cataloguing initiatives that were successfully proposed but
did not appear on the ballot, as well as initiatives that were denied or withdrawn).
4. The last comprehensive treatment of the Alaskan ballot measure process
in legal scholarship was authored in 1992. M. Katheryn Bradley & Deborah L.
Williams, “Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Alaska . . .”—A Practitioner’s
Guide to Alaska’s Initiative Law, 9 ALASKA L. REV. 279 (1992).
5. Constitutional Convention, U. OF ALASKA (June 15, 2009, 10:40 AM),
https://www.alaska.edu/creatingalaska/constitutional-convention/.
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During this nearly month-long endeavor, the delegates devoted
significant time to the ballot initiative.6 The delegates formed a committee
to examine this form of direct legislation.7 The Committee described the
process as “the power of the people to initiate laws themselves”—in other
words, direct democracy—and that portion of the Alaska Constitution as
“reserv[ing] the authority of the people to initiate laws by petition and
vote of the people directly.”8
The delegates believed that “[t]he exercise of the initiative is a
fundamental right of the people.”9 In adopting what ultimately came to
be article XI of the Alaska Constitution, the delegates “went into the
historical background of the initiative” in the nineteen other states that
then used it.10 They tried to strike a careful balance between three
concerns: (1) permitting direct democracy in a way that was easy for the
public to use and understand;11 (2) preserving legislative power by
imposing certain restrictions on use of the initiative and giving the
legislature the opportunity to enact a version of any given initiative;12 and
(3) relieving the judiciary of adjudicating clearly unlawful measures.13

6. See, e.g., 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 928–
84 (Dec. 16, 1955) [hereinafter PACC] (discussing proposed constitutional
provision on initiatives).
7. See 1 PACC 70 (Nov. 10, 1955) (statement of Del. Burke Riley) (proposing
the “Committee on Direct Legislation, Amendment and Revision”). This Article
focuses almost solely on the initiative process; it does not attempt to
comprehensively address either recall or referendum. The referendum is the
mechanism for voters to approve or reject acts of the legislature, as opposed to
proactively enacting their own laws through initiative. See ALASKA CONST. art. XI,
§ 1 (“The people may propose and enact laws by the initiative, and approve or
reject acts of the legislature by the referendum.”).
8. 2 PACC 929 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. E. B. Collins).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 931 (statement of Del. Warren A. Taylor). South Dakota was the first
state to adopt the initiative process in 1898. State-by-State List of Initiative and
Referendum Provisions, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST.,
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/states.cfm (last visited Sept. 8, 2020). Prior to
1955, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington had also adopted the
initiative process. Id.
11. See 2 PACC 929 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. E. B. Collins) (“The
procedure outlined has the advantage of brevity while insuring the substantive
rights to the people.”).
12. See id. (“If the legislature adopts a measure that is the subject of the
initiative, the measure does not have to be submitted to the people.”).
13. See id. (“To prevent waste of money on elections for laws that are
unconstitutional, sponsors are required to submit a proposed law to the Attorney
General for certification of its constitutionality . . . . [This] provision is intended to
stop, at the initial stage, the circulation of petitions for laws that would . . . result
in expensive court action.”).
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The delegates knew that direct democracy was not universal to the states,
and that there was “some difference of opinion” both among the delegates
and around the country “as to whether or not the principle of the
initiative . . . [was] a desirable and necessary one.”14 They observed that
Alaska had “very little [direct democracy] under our Territorial setup,
such as they have had in the states.”15 But the Committee ultimately
considered the initiative a “useful and desirable” addition to the Alaska
Constitution, with “certain safeguards.”16
In practice, unlike many other states whose constitutions
“contain[ed] a great degree of detail relating to the exercise of the
initiative,” the delegates wanted the legislature to “provide . . . some
details” of the initiative process while not “restrict[ing] the substantive
rights” of direct democracy, “nor to requir[ing] procedures more
difficult” than those enshrined in the Alaska Constitution.17 They
endorsed the legislature enacting “additional details of procedure”
(subject to constitutional limitations), but intended the constitutional
provision to have “the advantage of brevity while insuring the
substantive rights of the people.”18 They wanted the law-making power
of the people to be generally commensurate to that of the legislature.19
Article XII, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution specifically provides that
“[u]nless clearly inapplicable, the law-making powers assigned to the
legislature may be exercised by the people through initiative, subject to
the limitations of Article XI.”20
The delegates also wanted to give the legislature a chance to enact
its own version of whatever initiative the people were proposing, in order
to safeguard the legislature’s role as the lawmaking body, stating: “If the
legislature adopts a measure that is the subject of the initiative, the
measure does not have to be submitted to the people.”21 The delegates did
not want the public—or the courts—to waste their time on ballot
measures that were plainly illegal. The Committee envisioned that “[t]o
prevent waste of money on elections for laws that are unconstitutional,”
sponsors would be “required to submit a proposed law to the Attorney
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 931 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. Victor C. Rivers).
Id. at 800 (Dec. 13, 1955) (statement of Del. Irwin L. Metcalf).
Id. at 933 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. Victor C. Rivers).
Id. at 929 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. E. B. Collins); see, e.g., WASH.
CONST. art. II, § 1 (providing a detailed outline of how the initiative power
functions in Washington state).
18. 2 PACC 929 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. E. B. Collins).
19. See id. at 931 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. Warren A. Taylor) (noting
that even if the initiative is not frequently used, “it serves a useful purpose in this
way that the legislature does know that the people have reserved to them the right
to initiate legislation and the right to pass upon legislation that has been
passed . . . so that ultimately they can, if they deem fit, can guide the legislature”).
20. ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 11.
21. 2 PACC 929 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. E. B. Collins).
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General for certification of its constitutionality, subject to court review,
prior to the circulation of petitions.”22 This proposed procedure was
“intended to stop, at the initial stage, the circulation of petitions for laws
that would, even if approved by the voters, result in expensive court
action.”23
The ballot initiative committee found some legislative power to be
out of bounds. The Committee’s studies of other states showed that “in
practically all the states that have the initiative . . . there are certain
limitations placed upon the matters that can be acted upon by those
measures.”24 The delegates debated and decided against unfettered use
of the initiative, and created certain limitations intended to “prevent the
abuses and problems that have sometimes arisen in the states permitting
initiative and referendum.”25 Among the limitations included in the
Constitution are ballot initiatives that purport to divest the legislature of
its appropriations and spending power, which in “some instances”
caused the “governmental functions and governmental institutions [to
suffer] a great deal.”26 The initiative was also not to “be used with regard
to emergency legislation, appropriations, or measures earmarking taxes
and other revenues, or for special or local laws that are of interest to only
one group of people or people only in one portion of the state.”27 Some
sixty-five years later, history would show that it was the restrictions
placed on the initiative—and not necessarily the initiative right itself—
that would generate the most dispute and jurisprudence.28
B.

Today’s Initiative: Article XI and the Delegates’ Vision Realized

The delegates’ assiduous study bore fruit. Today, Article XI of the
Alaska Constitution is a carefully crafted set of rights, duties, and
standards governing use of the initiative; one that honors the people’s
fundamental right to direct legislation and yet reserves core powers to the
legislature.29 The Alaska Constitution provides that “the people may
22. Id. Ultimately, the Attorney General’s role in the ballot measure process
did not become part of the Alaska Constitution; rather, it was codified in statute
to a limited degree and expanded in practice to an even greater extent. See
generally infra Part IV.
23. 2 PACC 929 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. E. B. Collins). Of course, this
standard led to lengthy debate among the delegates. See infra Part IV.
24. 2 PACC 931 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. Warren A. Taylor).
25. Id. at 929 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. E. B. Collins).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 930.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See 2 PACC 932 (Dec. 16, 1955) (statement of Del. Warren A. Taylor)
(noting that the delegates’ approach reserves “the right of the people” to the
initiative, but as “in practically all states that have the initiative . . . there are
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propose and enact laws by the initiative.”30 The Alaska Constitution
further dictates both an application and a petition phase of the initiative
process: “An initiative is proposed by an application containing the bill to
be initiated . . . signed by not less than one hundred qualified voters as
sponsors,” filed with the lieutenant governor for certification, with denial
of certification “subject to judicial review.”31 “After certification of the
application, a petition containing a summary of the subject matter” must
be “prepared by the lieutenant governor for circulation by the
sponsors.”32
Petition circulators must meet certain numerical and geographical
thresholds for signature collection prior to filing—thresholds made
somewhat more restrictive by a 2004 constitutional amendment.33
certain limitations”).
30. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 1.
31. Id. § 2; see also ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.240 (2020) (permitting judicial review
of certification decisions within 30 days of the date on which notice of the
determination was given). The position of lieutenant governor of Alaska contains
a somewhat unique set of responsibilities. The lieutenant governor must “have
the same qualifications as the governor and serve for the same term. He shall
perform such duties as may be prescribed by law and as may be delegated to him
by the governor.” ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 7. Further, the Lieutenant Governor is
required to “administer state election laws,” including those related to ballot
initiatives. ALASKA STAT. § 44.19.020(1) (2020).
32. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 3.
33. See GORDON HARRISON, ALASKA LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY, ALASKA’S
CONSTITUTION: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 183 (5th ed. 2012) (noting that the amendment
requires signatures from “at least three-fourths” of house districts, instead of
previously only two-thirds, and adding the requirement that in each of those
districts signatures make up “at least seven percent of those who voted in the
preceding general election in the house district”). Amendments to the Alaska
Constitution are accomplished by a two-thirds vote of each house of the
legislature and a majority of the voters at the next general election. ALASKA CONST.
art. XIII, § 1. The amendment was described to Alaska voters on the 2004 general
election ballot as follows:
BALLOT MEASURE NO. 1. House Joint Resolution No. 5. Signatures
for Initiative and Referendum Petitions: This amendment changes how
to gather signatures for an initiative or referendum petition. It requires
signatures from more of the voting districts in the State. It says that
signers must be from at least 30 of the 40 house districts, three more than
now required. It further requires signatures from each of 30 districts to
be at least equal to seven percent of the voters who voted in each of these
districts in the last general election. Currently only one signer from a
district satisfies the requirement for district participation. The total
number of statewide signatures required does not change. Should this
constitutional amendment be adopted?
Official Election Pamphlet, STATE OF ALASKA DIV. OF ELECTIONS 87 (2004),
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/oep/2004/2004oepreg1.pdf. Proponents
of the amendment felt this distribution requirement would better reflect the
voters’ will across the vast geography of the State by ensuring that “initiatives
truly reflect the wishes and goals of more Alaskans and not just those of wellfunded outside interests.” Id. at 88. Opponents felt it would make direct
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Specifically, before the sponsors file the petition with the lieutenant
governor, it must bear the signatures of:
[Q]ualified voters equal in number to at least ten percent of those
who voted in the preceding general election, who are resident in
at least three-fourths of the house districts of the State, and who,
in each of those house districts, are equal in number to at least
seven percent of those who voted in the preceding general
election in the house district.34
With respect to timing, “an initiative petition may be filed at any
time.”35 The lieutenant governor is required to “prepare a ballot title and
proposition summarizing the proposed law, and shall place them on the
ballot for the first statewide election held more than one hundred twenty
days after adjournment of the legislative session following the filing.”36 If,
during that intervening session and before the election, “substantially the
same measure has been enacted [by the legislature], the petition is void.”37
If an initiative is approved by a majority of voters at an election, it
becomes effective ninety days after the lieutenant governor certifies the
election results.38 An initiated law “is not subject to veto, and may not be
repealed by the legislature within two years of its effective date. It may be
amended at any time.”39

III. ARTICLE XI, SECTION 7: INITIATIVE RESTRICTIONS AND
DEVELOPING CASELAW
As discussed above, the delegates envisioned, and the constitution
contains, significant restrictions on use of the initiative. The Alaska
Constitution specifies that “[t]he initiative shall not be used to dedicate
democracy more difficult to access and was a “drastic and unnecessary change.”
Id. at 89. This is the only substantive amendment to the initiative process since the
Alaska Constitution was adopted. See Constitutional Amendments Appearing on the
Ballot in Alaska, STATE OF ALASKA DIV. OF ELECTIONS (Dec. 28, 2016),
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/forms/H28.pdf (listing the constitutional
amendments that have appeared on the ballot in Alaska). It passed by a margin
of 149,236 to 139,642, or approximately seven percent. Id. at 1.
34. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 3.
35. Id. § 4.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also infra Part IV.
38. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6. Certification of election results is a formality
that typically occurs several weeks after an election. See, e.g., Becky Bohrer, Alaska
Officials Hope to Certify Primary Results by Tuesday, KTUU NEWS (Aug. 31, 2018, 8:10
PM), https://www.ktuu.com/content/news/Alaska-officials-hope-to-certifyprimary-results-by-Tuesday-492220521.html (noting Alaskan officials hoped to
certify primary results two weeks after the August 21, 2018 primary).
39. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6.
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revenues, make or repeal appropriations, create courts, define the
jurisdiction of courts or prescribe their rules, or enact local or special
legislation.”40 The Court has held that these restrictions “are important
conditions on the initiative right that require strict compliance.”41 As with
most constitutional mandates, the meaning of these restrictions is distilled
through practice. Much of Alaska’s caselaw on initiatives focuses on these
enumerated restrictions, and, over the years, the Court has developed a
long line of jurisprudence interpreting them.42 This Part explores how the
Court has molded and shaped the parameters of these restrictions at both
the state and local levels, from the early days of statehood to the present.43
A.

Appropriations

The making and repealing of appropriations by initiative is the most
frequently litigated initiative restriction, in part because the Alaska
Constitution does not define “appropriation.”44 In elaborating on the
definition of “appropriation,” the Court consistently expanded the scope
of public assets subject to appropriation beyond just money. Indeed, the
first time the Court reviewed the appropriations restriction, it concluded
that it was intended to embrace land as well as money.45
In Thomas v. Bailey,46 the Court reviewed the constitutionality of the
“Alaska Homestead Act,” better known as “The Beirne Initiative.”47 The
Beirne Initiative sought to make thirty million acres of state land available
40. Id. § 7.
41. Citizens Coal. for Tort Reform v. McAlpine, 810 P.2d 162, 168 n.14 (Alaska
1991).
42. See infra Part III.
43. Like the State, local municipalities in Alaska have the power to enact laws
by initiative. When the initiative is local, and not statewide, the power to enact it
is statutory. See ALASKA STAT. § 29.26.100 (2020) (“The powers of initiative and
referendum are reserved to the residents of municipalities, except the powers do
not extend to matters restricted by art. XI sec. 7 of the state constitution.”); see also
Griswold v. City of Homer, 186 P.3d 558, 563 (Alaska 2008) (stating “because the
initiative was local, and not statewide, the power to initiate . . . was directly
derived from AS 29.26.100, not article XI, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution”).
The Municipal Clerk serves the same role as the Lieutenant Governor in this
parallel process, see ALASKA STAT. § 29.26.110 (2020) (explaining role of municipal
clerk in initiative process), and local enactments are subject to the same
constitutional standards and restrictions as statewide enactments, see ALASKA
STAT. § 29.26.100 (2020) (specifying powers of initiative and referendum “do not
extend to matters restricted by” the Alaska Constitution).
44. See Mallott v. Stand for Salmon, 431 P.3d 159, 164 (Alaska 2018) (“The
Alaska Constitution does not provide any definition of the term
‘appropriation’ . . . .”).
45. See Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 9 (Alaska 1979) (holding an initiative
was an unconstitutional appropriation because it was “an expenditure of state
assets in the form of public lands”).
46. 595 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1979).
47. Id. at 2.
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to Alaska residents, parceled out based on citizens’ length of residency,
subject to an application for the land grant and a nominal filing fee.48 The
fundamental question the Court addressed in Bailey was whether the
Beirne Initiative qualified as an unconstitutional appropriation.49 The
Court detailed at great length the delegates’ adoption of the initiative
restrictions in evaluating that key issue.50 The Court reasoned, “[i]n
Alaska, land is a primary asset of the state treasury” and saw “no rational
set of policy concerns that would prohibit an initiative from giving away
$9,000,000,000 but would permit it to give away 30 million acres, valued
at that sum.”51 Having decided that public land qualified as an asset of
the state treasury, the Court went on to consider whether the initiative
“appropriated” that asset.52 Ultimately, the Court held that the proposed
land grant constituted an appropriation because it “[was] still an
expenditure of state assets in the form of public lands,” and “would
substantially deplete the state government of valuable assets just as surely
as an initiative allotting to residents of specified years large sums of
money.”53 Accordingly, the measure was considered “an appropriation”
which therefore “[could] not be enacted by initiative.”54
In expanding the definition of appropriation beyond monetary
expenditures, Bailey set the stage for a series of decisions that would hone
the parameters of the appropriations restriction. Since Bailey, the Court
has decided that a number of non-monetary public assets are protected
by the appropriations restriction. In Alaska Conservative Political Action
Committee v. Municipality of Anchorage,55 the Court held that the restriction
applied to both state and municipal assets and that an initiative that
would require a municipality to transfer a major utility asset for the
nominal sum of one dollar was an unconstitutional appropriation.56 In
McAlpine v. University of Alaska,57 the Court held that an initiative that
would require the transfer of real and personal property from the
University to the Community College System was an unconstitutional
appropriation by initiative because, although it was not a prohibited
“give-away program” like the Beirne Initiative, it “committ[ed] certain

48. Id.
49. See id. (stating first issue presented is whether “the initiative make[s] an
appropriation, which is prohibited by the state constitution”).
50. Id. at 4–8.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Id. at 8–9.
53. Id. at 9.
54. Id.
55. 745 P.2d 936 (Alaska 1987).
56. Id. at 938.
57. 762 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988).
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public assets to a particular purpose.”58 In McAlpine the Court connected
its definition of appropriation with the purpose of the restriction,
determining that the transfer defeated a key purpose of the restriction:
“[T]o ensure that the legislature, and only the legislature, retains control
over the allocation of state assets among competing needs.”59 The Court
emphasized the restriction’s purpose to preserve the legislature’s role in
City of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks Convention & Visitors Bureau.60 There, the
Court held that an initiative that would place bed tax revenues in a
discretionary fund was not an unconstitutional appropriation because it
did not “set aside a certain specified amount of money or property for a
specific purpose or object in such a manner that is executable, mandatory,
and reasonably definite with no further legislative action.”61 These cases
and subsequent decisions affirm that initiative sponsors should be wary
of initiatives that restrict the legislature’s flexibility in determining the
fate of public assets.
Alaska’s natural resources have become a flashpoint for ballot
measure litigation, and in particular, appropriations arguments.62 In
Pullen v. Ulmer,63 the Court held that an initiative which set priorities
among different salmon harvest users was an unconstitutional
appropriation because it appealed to certain user groups’ self-interests
and significantly reduced the Board of Fisheries’ and the Legislature’s
control over allocation decisions.64 In so holding, the Court first found as
a threshold matter that salmon are public assets subject to appropriation
under article XI, section 7.65 The Court reasoned that “naturally occurring
salmon are, like other state natural resources, state assets belonging to the
state which controls them for the benefit of all of its people.”66 Therefore,
“the state’s interest in salmon migrating in state and inland waters is
sufficiently strong to warrant characterizing such salmon as public assets
58. Id. at 88.
59. Id. (emphasis in original).
60. 818 P.2d 1153 (Alaska 1991).
61. Id. at 1157. This test derives from McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 91. See also Pullen
v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 63 n.13 (Alaska 1996) (applying McAlpine and rejecting a
ballot measure distributing salmon to certain user groups as a violation of article
XI, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution).
62. In Brooks v. Wright, the Court upheld an initiative banning the use of
snares to trap wolves, concluding that “the legislature does not have exclusive
law-making powers over natural resources issues merely because of the state’s
management role over wildlife set forth in Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution.”
Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1033 (Alaska 1999). Accordingly, natural
resources could be regulated by ballot measure. No party in Brooks argued that
the measure was an appropriation, so the Court did not reach that question. Id. at
1028 n.12.
63. 923 P.2d 54 (Alaska 1996).
64. Id. at 63.
65. Id. at 61.
66. Id.
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of the state which may not be appropriated by initiative.”67 Those assets
were unconstitutionally appropriated under the initiative because the
measure appealed to voters’ self-interests and constricted the legislature’s
allocation authority.68
The Court’s most recent decision on appropriations by initiative was
Mallott v. Stand for Salmon,69 which centered on a ballot initiative that
aimed to regulate large-scale mining projects in anadromous salmon
habitat statewide. Stand for Salmon draws upon Pullen—and decades of
appropriations decisions in natural resources and other state and local
initiative cases that followed70—to clarify the current framework for
analyzing the constitutional limitation on appropriations by initiative.
One severable section of the Stand for Salmon measure violated the
appropriations clause by barring the Commissioner of the Department of
Fish and Game from issuing a permit to a project that would cause

67. Id.
68. Id. at 63.
69. 431 P.3d 159 (Alaska 2018).
70. See generally Lieutenant Governor v. Alaska Fisheries Conservation All.,
Inc., 363 P.3d 105, 106 (Alaska 2015) (rejecting “a proposed ballot initiative that
would ban commercial set net fishing in nonsubsistence areas” because “set
netters are a distinct commercial user group that deserves recognition in the
context of the constitutional prohibition on appropriations” and because the
measure “would completely appropriate salmon away from set netters and
prohibit the legislature from allocating any salmon to that user group”); Hughes
v. Treadwell, 341 P.3d 1121, 1131 (Alaska 2015) (upholding an initiative that
would require legislative approval for certain mining projects “because the
legislature would retain ultimate control over allocation of state assets”); All. of
Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 273 P.3d 1128, 1137
(Alaska 2012) (rejecting a ballot measure that would require voter approval for all
capital projects with a cost over $1 million because it “sufficiently narrow[ed] the
Borough’s ability to make allocation decisions”); Pebble Ltd. P’ship ex rel. Pebble
Mines Corp. v. Parnell, 215 P.3d 1064, 1075 (Alaska 2009) (upholding an initiative
that would regulate large-scale metallic mineral mining operations because it did
not ”narrow[] the legislature’s range of freedom to make allocation decisions in a
manner sufficient to render the initiative an appropriation”); Anchorage Citizens
for Taxi Reform v. Municipality of Anchorage, 151 P.3d 418, 420 (Alaska 2006)
(upholding an initiative requiring the city to issue a taxi permit to any qualified
person paying an administrative fee because taxicab permits were not public
assets); Staudenmaier v. Municipality of Anchorage, 139 P.3d 1259, 1263 (Alaska
2006) (rejecting an initiative that would permit the sale of municipal utilities for a
nominal fee because it “control[led] the use of public assets such that the voters
essentially usurp the legislature’s resource allocation role” and “by requiring the
sale of public assets”); Alaska Action Ctr., Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 84
P.3d 989, 993–95 (Alaska 2004) (rejecting an initiative setting aside and
designating certain parkland because it “specified amounts of public assets in a
way that encroaches on the legislative branch’s exclusive ‘control over the
allocation of state assets among competing needs’” and because it “intrude[d] on
decisions reserved by statute and constitution to the assembly” (quoting Pullen,
923 P.2d at 62)).
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substantial damage or have certain effects, “even if
in the
Commissioner’s—or the legislature’s—considered judgment the public
benefits of that particular project outweigh its effects on fish habitat.”71 In
so doing, that section “‘encroache[d] on the legislative branch’s exclusive
control over the allocation of state assets among competing needs by
removing certain allocation decisions from the legislature’s range of
discretion.”72
The Court’s holding focused on the “two core objectives” underlying
the prohibition against appropriations by initiative as the “foundation of
[the Court’s] appropriation analysis.”73 Those two objectives are (1) “to
prevent an electoral majority from bestowing state assets on itself” and
(2) to “preserve to the legislature the power to make decisions concerning
the allocation of state assets.”74 Stand for Salmon reiterated the ongoing
importance of these two objectives to the caselaw, holding that “prior
opinions repeatedly reaffirm the two core objectives by emphasizing the
importance of preserving the legislature’s authority over allocation
decisions,” although the test is applied “in different terms depending on
the context.”75 While noting that the caselaw to some degree “obscure[s]
and distract[s] from a focus”76 on these two core objectives, the Stand for
Salmon Court nevertheless reaffirmed prior holdings that “an initiative
effects an appropriation when it ‘would set aside a certain specified
amount of money or property for a specific purpose or object in such a
manner that is executable, mandatory, and reasonably definite with no
further legislative action.’”77
The restriction is also violated if “the initiative narrows the
legislature’s range of freedom to make allocation decisions in a manner
sufficient to render the initiative an appropriation.”78 Furthermore, “the
line between an unobjectionable initiative that deals with a public asset
and one that is an impermissible appropriation is crossed where an
initiative controls the use of public assets such that the voters essentially
usurp the legislature’s resource allocation role.”79 Stand for Salmon is
useful because it summarizes and assimilates the Court’s prior caselaw
on appropriations by initiative while rejecting dicta from prior opinions80
71. Stand for Salmon, 431 P.3d at 167.
72. Id. (quoting Alaska Action, 84 P.3d at 994).
73. Id. at 165.
74. Id. (emphasis omitted).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting Alaska Action, 84 P.3d at 993).
78. Id. (quoting All. of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. Kenai Peninsula
Borough, 273 P.3d 1128, 1137 (Alaska 2012)).
79. Id. (citing Hughes v. Treadwell, 341 P.3d 1121, 1128 (Alaska 2015))
(internal quotations omitted).
80. Stand for Salmon explicitly rejected the unpersuasive reasoning and dicta
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and re-centering the fulcrum of analysis on the two core objectives of the
restriction.
B.

Local or Special Legislation

Article XI, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution prohibits initiatives
that would constitute “local or special legislation.”81 Similar language
elsewhere in the Constitution places this same restriction on the
Legislature.82 As noted above, the Alaska Constitution specifically
provides that the “law-making powers assigned to the legislature may be
exercised by the people through the initiative, subject to the limitations of
article XI.”83 Accordingly, the subject of an “initiative must constitute
such legislation as the legislative body to which it is directed has the
power to enact.”84 The Court has made clear that this means “[t]he
people’s power to enact legislation by initiative is not greater than that of
the legislature.”85 So it is clear that the Court views the methods of
legislative and direct democracy as parallel powers with related
restrictions and scope.
The Court discussed both powers in Walters v. Cease,86 where ruling
on an attempt to repeal a legislative act by referendum brought into focus
the “local or special legislation” limitation as applied in both the
legislative and initiative contexts. In Walters the Court rejected the
attempted repeal by referendum of the Mandatory Borough Act, ruling
that the act at issue was a local or special enactment by the legislature and
therefore could not be repealed by initiative.87 The Court concluded that
the Mandatory Borough Act was “not a general act” because “[i]t selected
only a certain few communities which presumably met the standards for
incorporation as organized boroughs and declared that they were to

in Pebble. See id. at 167 (stating that the appropriations analysis in that case “[w]as
[d]ictum [a]nd [i]s [n]either [b]inding [p]recedent [n]or [p]ersuasive”).
81. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7.
82. See Id. art. II, § 19 (“The legislature shall pass no local or special act if a
general act can be made applicable.”).
83. Id. art. XII, § 11.
84. Municipality of Anchorage v. Frohne, 568 P.2d 3, 8 (Alaska 1977).
85. Alaskans for Legislative Reform v. State, 887 P.2d 960, 963 n.8 (Alaska
1994), overruled on other grounds by Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney, 71 P.3d
896 (Alaska 2003).
86. 394 P.2d 670 (Alaska 1964).
87. Id. at 671. The referendum is the mechanism for voters to approve or reject
acts of the legislature. See ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 1. Like the initiative, “[t]he
referendum shall not be applied . . . to local or special legislation.” Id. § 7.
Although Walters dealt with the referendum, it is analyzed in the same way as the
initiative with respect to the local or special legislation restriction.
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become incorporated,” but “made no mention of the rest of the state.”88
Accordingly, the act could not be referred to the voters for repeal because
it was “both local and special legislation within the meaning of article XI,
section 7 of the constitution.”89 Specifically, it was “local because it
applie[d] only to a limited number of geographical areas, rather than
being widespread in its operation throughout the state” and “special
because its method for incorporating organized boroughs [was] peculiar
to the few selected localities” where it applied.90
The Court’s “benchmark special legislation case”91 in the initiative
context is Boucher v. Engstrom,92 which set down a standard for
determining whether a proposed enactment qualifies as “local or
special.”93 In Boucher, the Court reversed the trial court which held that a
ballot measure proposing to relocate the state capital was local or special
legislation because it excluded Anchorage and Fairbanks as possible new
capital sites.94 The Court reasoned that “in deciding whether an initiative
is local or special legislation, we must consider the subject matter of the
initiative and determine whether the subject matter is of common interest
to the whole state.”95 There, the Court held that “the location of Alaska’s
capital has obvious statewide interest and impact” and cited Walters in
stating that “a law does not cease to be general, and become local or
special, because it operates only in certain subdivisions of the state.”96
Additionally, “[l]egislation, whether enacted by the legislature or by the
initiative, need not operate evenly on all parts of the state to avoid being
classified as local or special.”97
Boucher became a key standard in the only two subsequent cases
where the Court has interpreted the “local or special” restriction. Both
involved initiatives that in some way attempted to regulate mining
activity in the Bristol Bay watershed—the site of a fierce, decades-long
conflict between a proposed large-scale metallic sulfide mining operation
and a highly productive sockeye salmon fishery.98 In Pebble Limited
Partnership ex rel. Pebble Mines Corp. v. Parnell,99 the Court considered The
88. Walters, 394 P.2d at 672.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Pebble Ltd. P’ship ex rel. Pebble Mines Corp. v. Parnell, 215 P.3d 1064,
1078 (Alaska 2009).
92. 528 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1974), overruled on other grounds by McAlpine v.
Univ. of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81, 84 (Alaska 1988).
93. Id. at 461–64.
94. Id. at 459, 464.
95. Id. at 461.
96. Id. at 461–62 (citing Walters v. Cease, 394 P.2d 670 (Alaska 1964)).
97. Id. at 463.
98. See, e.g., Lisa W. Drew, Prospect of a Mine Near a Salmon Fishery Stirs Worry
in Alaska, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2005, at F4.
99. 215 P.3d 1064 (Alaska 2009).
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Alaska Clean Water Initiative, a measure that proposed to limit the
discharge of certain toxic pollutants on state lands and waters.100 The
Court in Pebble framed the Boucher test as a two-part analysis in which the
Court first makes “a threshold inquiry as to whether the proposed
legislation is of general, statewide applicability” or rather is “of interest
to only one group of people or people in only one portion of the state.”101
If the Court determines that the initiative is of statewide application, the
inquiry ends; otherwise, it moves to step two, in which the Court
“determine[s] the relationship between the narrow focus of the proposed
legislation and the purpose of the proposed legislation”102 by assessing
“whether the legislation ‘bears a fair and substantial relationship to
legitimate purposes.’”103 The Court “address[ed] ‘the reasonableness of
the regulation or the classification of the subject matter,’” analogous to a
rational basis standard of review.104 In Pebble, the Court upheld the
initiative at issue because, although it would impact two specific mines—
Pebble and Donlin Creek—the Court determined that the initiative’s
language was “sufficiently broad” that it would apply to other large scale
metallic sulfide mining operations as well.105 Therefore, the proposed
enactment applied statewide and the Court did not reach the second part
of the test, although the Court did note that “it would pass muster”
because of the statewide interest in water quality, fish and wildlife, and
the fishing industry.106
Six years later, in Hughes v. Treadwell,107 the Court again confronted
a ballot measure focused on the Bristol Bay watershed. The purpose of
“Bristol Bay Forever” “was to enact law ‘providing for [the] protection of
Bristol Bay wild salmon and waters within or flowing into the existing
1972 Bristol Bay Fisheries Reserve’” by requiring legislative approval
before certain large-scale metallic sulfide mines could be built.108 The
100. Id. at 1069.
101. Id. at 1078 (quoting Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 461, 461 n.17)).
102. Id. at 1078–79.
103. Id. at 1079 (quoting State v. Lewis, 559 P.2d 630, 643 (Alaska 1977)).
104. Id. (quoting Boucher, 528 P.2d at 461). See also Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422,
430–31 (Alaska 1998) (holding that a statute modifying certain gas leases, though
not of statewide application, was not local or special legislation because it was
fairly and substantially related to legitimate state purposes). The rational basis
test, applied to equal protection challenges, asks whether a particular legislative
enactment is reasonable, not arbitrary, and “rest[s] upon some ground of
difference having fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.”
McConkey v. Hart, 930 P.2d 402, 408 (Alaska 1996).
105. Pebble Limited P’ship ex rel. Pebble Mines Corp., 215 P.3d at 1080.
106. Id.
107. 341 P.3d 1121 (Alaska 2015).
108. Id. at 1123–24 (quoting Ballot Measure 4: Alaska Bristol Bay Mining Ban
(2012)).
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Court considered, among other questions, whether the act was local or
special legislation within the meaning of article XI, section 7, concluding
that it was not.109 In this case, however, the parties agreed that the
measure only applied to Bristol Bay, meaning it failed the threshold
inquiry which required the Court to consider the second phase of the
Boucher inquiry.110 The Court found “no serious question that requiring
legislative approval of large-scale metallic sulfide mining operations in
the Bristol Bay watershed bears a fair and substantial relationship to” the
act’s stated purpose.111 The Court “conclude[d] that Bristol Bay’s unique
and significant biological and economic characteristics are of great
interest not just to the Bristol Bay region but to the state as a whole,” that
the stated purpose to protect it was legitimate, and that the measure bore
a fair and substantial relationship to that purpose.112 “The sponsors,” held
the Court, “certainly could have proposed an initiative of statewide
application, but instead they chose to focus on a very important fishery in
a single region,” which was acceptable because “legislatures routinely
must draw lines and create classifications.”113 As in the equal protection
context, “a statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might
have gone farther than it did” nor need it “strike at all evils at the same
time” and it may make incremental reforms that “take one step at a time,
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to
the legislative mind.”114 In applying the Boucher test these cases make
clear that ballot measures that do not have statewide application—but
that invariably have statewide impact—are likely to survive the Boucher
test as refined by Pebble and Hughes.
C.

Dedicated Revenue

Another constitutional restriction on initiatives prohibits dedicating
revenue through direct democracy.115 As with local and special
legislation, the prohibition against dedicating revenue by initiative has
another constitutional parallel: the public finance provisions of the Alaska
Constitution which provide that, with limited exception, “[t]he proceeds
of any state tax or license shall not be dedicated to any special purpose.”116
The Court has not often adjudicated initiative cases that presented a
109. Id. at 1134. The Court also rejected an argument that the measure was an
unconstitutional appropriation. Id. at 1131.
110. Id. at 1131.
111. Id. at 1132.
112. Id. at 1133.
113. Id. (quoting Pebble Ltd. P’ship ex rel. Pebble Mines Corp. v. Parnell, 215
P.3d 1064, 1081 (Alaska 2009)).
114. Id. at 1133–34 (quoting Pebble, 215 P.3d at 1081).
115. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7.
116. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 7.
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dedication of revenue problem, but when it has done so the Court has
often relied on precedent from the legislative context.
The Court directly considered the restriction of dedicating revenue
in the initiative context for the first time in City of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks
Convention and Visitors Bureau.117 In that case a voter initiative sought to
rearrange allocation of bed tax revenues collected from hotels and
motels.118 The Court analogized the initiative process to more general
legislative processes—in this case, the article XI, section 7 dedication
question to the parallel prohibition in article IX, section 7—”[b]ecause the
language of these two provisions is similar.”119 Accordingly, the Court
“adopt[ed] a similar analysis of the meaning of each provision and the
purposes behind them.”120 Relying on its precedent set in State v. Alex121
from the legislative context, the Court in City of Fairbanks found that the
bed tax was not a dedication of revenue because it did not create specific
rights to funds for specific groups, earmark any funds for particular
organizations, or create any mandatory expenditures.122 The purpose of
the bed tax initiative was to “[fund] city facilities and services for the
general public,” which was “so broad as to include any city
expenditures.”123
As with “the two core objectives” of the appropriations restriction,
the Court examined “the two main motivations behind the ban on
dedicated revenues,” which are “to maintain the potential of flexibility in
budgeting and to ensure that the legislature did not abdicate
responsibility for the budget.”124 Because the bed tax initiative did not
“infringe on flexibility in the budget process,” and indeed enhanced that
flexibility by removing existing restraints, the measure was not a
prohibited dedication of revenue.125 City of Fairbanks remains the leading
case on dedicated revenues by initiative.

117. 818 P.2d 1153 (Alaska 1991).
118. Id. at 1154–55.
119. Id. at 1158.
120. Id.
121. 646 P.2d 203 (Alaska 1982) (holding unconstitutional a state statute that
imposed a tax on the sale of salmon, the proceeds of which were to be mandatorily
allocated to regional associations to enhance salmon production, leaving no
legislative discretion to spend the revenues in any other way). Alex applied the
parallel constitutional restriction on the legislative process from article IX, § 7 of
the Alaska Constitution.
122. City of Fairbanks, 818 P.2d at 1158.
123. Id. (quoting the Interior Taxpayers Association’s proposed modifications
to FAIRBANKS, ALASKA, GENERAL CODE ORDINANCE § 5.402(a) (1988)).
124. Id. Of course, only the first of these two concerns applies to ballot
initiatives.
125. Id. at 1158–59.
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D.

Creation of Courts, Jurisdiction of Courts, and Rules of Court

Finally, article XI, section 7 also prohibits enacting initiatives that
would “create courts, define the jurisdiction of courts or prescribe their
rules.”126 The Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted this restriction only
once. In Citizens Coalition for Tort Reform v. McAlpine,127 the lieutenant
governor declined to certify an initiative that would have set maximum
allowable attorneys’ fees in personal injury cases, on the ground that the
measure was an attempt to prescribe a rule of court in violation of article
XI, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution.128 When the refusal to certify was
challenged, the Court considered two inter-related issues: (1) “whether a
limit on attorney contingent fees is necessarily classifiable as a rule of
court” and, if so, (2) “whether article XI, section 7 of the constitution
removes such a rule from the scope of the people’s power to legislate by
initiative.”129
The Court answered both questions in the affirmative.130 The Court
cited its constitutional rule making power from article IV, section 1 of the
Alaska Constitution,131 noting that one judicial power it has “exercised
repeatedly is the power to regulate the practice of law in the state.”132 The
Court found that the initiative’s contingent fee limit was inherently a
court rule because it would “constrain any court’s analysis of whether a
particular contingent fee was ‘reasonable’ or ‘clearly excessive’” under
existing bar or disciplinary rules governing the conduct of attorneys.133
The Court looked at caselaw from numerous other states with similar
rules and was persuaded that “a limit on attorneys’ contingent fees is
properly classifiable as a rule of court” because the Court, pursuant to its
inherent powers, “might promulgate or reject a rule limiting contingent
fees to maximum permissible amounts, just as other state courts have
rejected or promulgated like rules pursuant to like authority.”134
Having determined that the initiative could be classified as a court
rule, the Court reviewed Constitutional Convention minutes in
concluding that the initiative was prohibited by article XI, section 7
because “rules regulating the practice of law often are equally as
sophisticated, technical, or sensitive as rules governing the
126. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7.
127. 810 P.2d 162 (Alaska 1991).
128. Id. at 163–64.
129. Id. at 164.
130. Id. at 165, 168.
131. Id. at 165 (“The court’s rule-making authority under this section is
inherent in the judicial power vested in it, as the supreme court of the state.”).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 166 (quoting ALASKA RULES OF BAR R. 35 and ALASKA RULES OF
PROF’L. RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (1991)).
134. Id. at 167.
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administration, practice, and procedure in the courts.”135 Accordingly,
“the purpose of the restriction against prescribing court rules in article XI,
section 7 logically extends to rules we may adopt under our
[constitutional] power to regulate the practice of law and the conduct of
attorneys in the state.”136 Creating courts or defining their jurisdiction are
fairly straightforward prohibitions and therefore do not often come up in
proposed initiatives. Any further disputes on this restriction are likely to
be about the more complicated questions of court rules, like the one at
issue in Citizens for Tort Reform.

IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF BALLOT INITIATIVES AND THE ROLE OF
THE LEGISLATURE
Beyond the article XI, section 7 initiative restrictions themselves, the
caselaw and statutes contain numerous standards that guide the public
and practitioners on four important guideposts: (1) the scope of the
Court’s pre-election review of ballot measures; (2) the source and
meaning of the “clearly unconstitutional under controlling authority”
standard; (3) the single-subject rule; and (4) the role of the legislature in
the initiative process.
A.

Pre-Election Review

Most initiative litigation occurs well before the measure reaches the
ballot—in the pre-election phase, after the lieutenant governor has
certified or denied certification, but before the election.137 As discussed in
Part IV.D, the lieutenant governor—with the assistance of the Attorney
General—has a gate-keeping role and reviews ballot measures for general
compliance with article XI, section 7 and other technical requirements of
application filing.138 Part of that review, of course, is determining whether
the application meets the standards of pre-election review applied by the
Alaska Supreme Court.
The standard of review the Court applies to its own pre-election
review of ballot measures is deferential to initiative sponsors.139 Except
135. Id. at 170.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 139–166.
138. See discussion infra Section IV.D.
139. See, e.g., Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney, 71 P.3d 896, 899 (Alaska
2003) (stating “[t]he Alaska Constitution expressly allows for expansive direct
democracy through initiatives . . . . Because the Alaska Constitution preserves the
people’s power to propose and enact laws through initiatives, we have repeatedly
held that courts must give statutory and constitutional regulations of initiatives
liberal, broad readings.”).
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with respect to the initiative restrictions discussed in Part III and two
additional limitations discussed below, the Court gives a liberal
construction to the people’s right to direct democracy.140 The Court has
stated that “[i]n matters of initiative and referendum . . . the people are
exercising a power reserved to them by the constitution and the laws of
the state . . . and . . . the constitutional and statutory provisions under
which they proceed should be liberally construed.”141 Accordingly, “all
doubts as to technical deficiencies or failure to comply with the exact
letter of procedure will be resolved in favor of the accomplishment of that
purpose.”142
State v. Trust the People143 is the leading case on the scope of preelection review for ballot measures. Shortly after then-Governor Frank
Murkowski appointed his daughter, Lisa, to a vacant United States Senate
seat, a group of initiative sponsors sought to repeal the statute allowing
for such appointments and require them to be filled by special election
instead.144 The State challenged the initiative, arguing that the proposal
violated the Seventeenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
and therefore should not reach the ballot box.145 Siding with the initiative
sponsors, the Court ruled for the sponsors over the State’s arguments that
the proposal violated the Seventeenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.146 The Court held that “pre-election judicial review may
extend only to subject matter restrictions that arise from a provision of
Alaska law that expressly addresses and restricts Alaska’s
constitutionally established initiative process or to proposals that are
clearly unlawful under controlling authority.”147
In so holding, the Court observed that “a narrow interpretation of
the permissible scope of pre-election review is faithful to our case law, is
supported by the strong policies that generally disfavor advisory
opinions, and is justified by the limited purpose of pre-election review—
to protect the Alaska Constitution’s express provisions defining the
initiative process.”148 Because the subject matter of this initiative—filling
senate vacancies—was not specifically barred from the initiative process
under article XI, section 7, nor “clearly inapplicable” under article XII,
section 11, nor was clearly resolved by controlling authority, “[i]ts
ultimate compliance with the Seventeenth Amendment falls outside the
140. See id. (noting that courts liberally construe initiative statutes because of
the role initiatives play in maintaining direct democracy).
141. Municipality of Anchorage v. Frohne, 568 P.2d 3, 8 (Alaska 1977).
142. Id. (quoting Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 462 (Alaska 1974)).
143. 113 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2005).
144. Id. at 616.
145. Id. at 617.
146. Id. at 615.
147. Id. at 624.
148. Id. at 628.
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proper scope of the lieutenant governor’s pre-election review.”149 The
Court’s decision circumscribed the scope of the lieutenant governor’s preelection review and set down the “clearly unlawful” standard that later
decisions would more clearly define.
B.

“Clearly Unconstitutional Under Controlling Authority”

After Trust the People, it was clear that the scope of pre-election
review is narrow.150 Executive branch officials are not to undertake the
role of judges and screen out ballot measures that simply raise general
constitutional concerns or issues of first impression.151 The Court itself
also will not entertain pre-election challenges to ballot measures—even
constitutional challenges—that are not surgically targeted at the article XI,
section 7 restrictions.152 As discussed in Part II, however, Alaska’s framers
envisioned an initiative process that would not waste the voters’ or the
courts’ time on expensive proposals that were clearly unlawful or would
never pass muster,153 a vision that Trust the People acknowledged.154
Developing a workable standard that balances these interests resulted in
a handful of decisions telling us that the bar is low—essentially limiting
pre-election review to weeding out the sorts of proposals that a
reasonable lay person would construe as a waste of time.
In Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney,155 the Court gave an example of
the type of initiative that a municipal clerk156—in their capacity as a
gatekeeper—could reject under this standard: “a clerk should reject an
initiative mandating local school segregation based on race” in light of the
United States Supreme Court’s desegregation decision in Brown v. Board

149. Id. at 628–29. See also Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney, 71 P.3d 896,
899–900 (Alaska 2003) (holding that a municipal clerk “should only reject an
initiative petition that violates any of the liberally construed statutory or
constitutional restrictions on initiatives or that proposes a substantive ordinance
where controlling authority establishes its unconstitutionality” because “it is not
the Clerk’s duty to reject every petition that may raise a constitutional issue . . . .
To do so would effectively be a decision by the Clerk that a proposal is
unconstitutional merely because no authority exists expressly declaring it
unconstitutional;” furthermore, “[i]f this were permitted, every initiative raising
an issue of first impression would be defeated before reaching the voters.”).
150. See Trust the People, 113 P.3d at 628.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 624.
153. See supra notes 21–23.
154. Trust the People, 113 P.3d at 615.
155. 71 P.3d 896 (Alaska 2003).
156. The municipal clerk acts in a parallel role to the lieutenant governor for
review of local ballot initiatives and the same test is applied. See supra note 43.
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of Education.157 Similarly, in Kohlhass v. State158 an initiative that called for
Alaska’s secession from the United States was properly rejected because
“the initiative [sought] a clearly unconstitutional end.”159 Specifically,
“[e]ven though secession is not explicitly addressed in the United States
or Alaska Constitutions, it is clearly unconstitutional” based on “a
plentitude of [United States] Supreme Court cases holding as completely
null the purported acts of secession” by Confederate states during the
Civil War.160 Because “opinions of the [United States] Supreme Court
interpreting the federal constitution . . . constitute controlling authority,”
the measure was properly rejected.161 In Desjarlais v. State,162 the Court
held that the lieutenant governor had properly rejected an initiative that
would generally prohibit abortion, because the proposed initiative clearly
contravened controlling United States Supreme Court caselaw in Roe v.
Wade.163 The Court’s precedent dictates that a ballot measure is only
properly rejected as “clearly unconstitutional” where “controlling
authority leaves no room for argument” about its unconstitutionality.164
From these cases we can glean that the Alaska Supreme Court means
what it says: Only the most explicitly unconstitutional measures will be
screened out of the certification process.165 Under the relevant caselaw,
neither the lieutenant governor nor a municipal clerk may encroach on
the role of the judiciary in entertaining possible constitutional infirmities
and using their discretion to vet ballot measures on that basis.166 Given
the Court’s restriction on its own pre-election review, disputed
constitutional problems, to the extent they exist in an initiative bill, may
be resolved only if and after Alaska’s voters enact the measure.

157. Mahoney, 71 P.3d at901 n.22 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294
(1955)).
158. 147 P.3d 714 (Alaska 2006).
159. Id. at 715.
160. Id. at 719.
161. Id. at 719–20.
162. 300 P.3d 900 (Alaska 2013).
163. Id. at 904–05 (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
164. Id. at 903 (quoting Alaska Action Ctr., Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage,
84 P.3d 989, 992 (Alaska 2004)).
165. See id. (“A petition may be rejected as ‘clearly unconstitutional’ only ‘if
controlling authority leaves no room for argument about its unconstitutionality.’”
(citing Alaska Action, 84 P.3d at 992 (Alaska 2004))).
166. See Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney, 71 P.3d 896, 900 (Alaska 2003)
(“In both cases it is the courts, not the clerk or the executive, that are primarily
responsible for constitutional adjudication.”).
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The Single-Subject Rule

While the Alaska Constitution requires the legislature to confine bills
to a single subject,167 there is no analogous provision in the constitution
governing initiatives.168 However, state statute requires that an initiative
bill similarly “be confined to one subject.”169 The Alaska Supreme Court
has interpreted this statute to extend to the people enacting laws by
initiative because article XI, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution sets “the
law making power [of the legislature and initiative sponsors as] equal,”
such that the constitutional single-subject rule imposed on the legislature
applies equally to initiative bills.170
This year, the Court clarified and reaffirmed this principle of equal
footing between the legislature and the people acting by initiative.171 Until
June of 2020, the two leading cases on the single-subject rule as applied to
initiatives were Yute Air Alaska, Inc. v. McAlpine and Croft v. Parnell.172
Initiative opponents in Yute Air challenged the measure at issue on singlesubject grounds, arguing that combining the regulation of state and local
transportation with federal maritime law violated the single-subject
principle.173 The Court rejected that argument, relying on prior singlesubject precedent in the context of legislative enactments to find that the
measure’s provisions all sensibly related to eliminating “regulations and
statutes thought to create needless transportation costs” under the
broader umbrella subject of “transportation.”174
Decades later, the sole issue in Croft was the single-subject
compliance of a ballot measure that created a program to provide public
campaign funding to candidates, proposed a three-cent tax per barrel on
oil produced in Alaska, provided that the legislature could appropriate
the tax to fund the program, and created a non-binding directive to
transfer excess funds to the Permanent Fund Dividend.175 There, the
Court found that the measure violated the single-subject rule.176 It
reasoned that the rule “protects the voters’ ability to effectively exercise
167. ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 13 (“Every bill shall be confined to one subject
unless it is an appropriation bill or one codifying, revising, or rearranging existing
laws.”).
168. See Yute Air Alaska, Inc. v. McAlpine, 698 P.2d 1173, 1179 n.2 (Alaska
1985) (noting that the state legislature subsequently enacted the single-subject
requirement vis-à-vis initiatives).
169. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.040(1) (2020).
170. Yute Air, 698 P.2d at 1179 n.2.
171. Meyer v. Alaskans for Better Elections, 465 P.3d 477, 497 (Alaska 2020).
172. 236 P.3d 369 (Alaska 2010).
173. Yute Air, 698 P.2d at 1175.
174. Id. at 1182.
175. Croft, 236 P.3d at 370–71.
176. Id. at 370.

176

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37:2

their right to vote by requiring that different proposals be voted on
separately.”177 This “allows voters to express their will through their votes
more precisely, prevents the adoption of policies through stealth or fraud,
and prevents the passage of measures lacking popular support by means
of log-rolling.”178
The Court’s analysis began with a review of its standards for
evaluating single-subject challenges.179 It stated that in ruling on such
challenges, the Court “must balance the rule’s purpose against the need
for efficiency in the legislative process,” since “[i]f the rule were applied
too narrowly, statutes might be restricted unduly in scope and
permissible subject matter.”180 The Court’s “solution has been to construe
the single-subject ‘provision . . . with considerable breadth.’”181 Under
that standard, “[a]ll that is necessary is that [the] act should embrace some
one [sic] general subject” and “that all matters treated of should fall under
some one general idea, be so connected with or related to each other,
either logically or in popular understanding, as to be parts of, or germane
to, one general subject.”182 The Croft Court ultimately rejected the
initiative at issue, holding that it “directly implicate[d] one of the main
purposes of the single-subject rule—the prevention of log-rolling—in two
ways.”183 First, the measure’s “coupling the approval of a new oil
production tax with approval of a program to publicly fund elections
deprive[d] the voters of an opportunity to send a clear message on each
subject” of the initiative.184 Second, the non-binding directive to the
legislature to transfer excess funds to the Permanent Fund Dividend was
“entirely unrelated to the purpose of the clean elections program” and
therefore “offering the chance of increased Permanent Fund Dividend
payments runs the risk of garnering support for the clean elections
program from voters who are otherwise indifferent—or even
unsupportive—of publicly funded campaigns.”185
On June 12, 2020, the Court removed any doubt that the singlesubject rule applies to initiatives with the same force and power as it does

177. Id. at 372.
178. Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing Suber v. Alaska State Bond Comm.,
414 P.2d 546, 557 (Alaska 1966) (discussing protection against “stealth and
fraud”)); Gellert v. State, 522 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Alaska 1974) (discussing protection
against “log-rolling”). Log-rolling “consists of deliberately inserting in one bill
several dissimilar or incongruous subjects in order to secure the necessary support
for passage of the measure.” Short v. State, 600 P.2d 20, 23 (Alaska 1979).
179. Croft, 236 P.3d at 372–73.
180. Id. at 372 (internal quotation omitted) (citing Gellert, 522 P.2d at 1122).
181. Id. at 372–73 (citing Gellert, 522 P.2d at 1122).
182. Id. at 373 (quoting Gellert, 522 P.2d at 1123).
183. Id. at 374.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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to legislative enactments. In Meyer v. Alaskans for Better Elections,186 the
lieutenant governor rejected, on single-subject grounds, a broad measure
to enact statewide election reform by creating a non-partisan open
primary, a ranked-choice general election, and mandating new
disclosures in campaign finance law.187 The Court held that “[t]he
initiative’s provisions substantively modify current election laws such
that we can logically conclude they fall under the one subject of ‘election
reform.’”188 In so holding, the Court rejected the State’s arguments that (1)
the single-subject test should be stricter for initiative sponsors and (2) the
Court should overturn prior caselaw to the extent it allowed for “even
footing” between the legislature and initiative sponsors with respect to
application of that test.189 The Court agreed with the initiative committee
“that imposing a stricter one-subject standard to initiatives than to
legislation would run counter to the delegates’ intent that the initiative
serve as the people’s check on the legislature . . . when the legislature fails
to pass laws the people believe are needed.”190 The Court concluded that
“it now is up to the people to decide whether the initiative’s provisions
should become law” when it comes before the voters in November
2020.191
D.

The Legislature’s Role in Initiatives: Amendment, Repeal, and
Substantially Similar Legislation

As discussed in Part II, the framers of the Alaska Constitution sought
to preserve certain legislative powers without allowing the legislature to
undermine direct democracy.192 The Constitution thus prohibits the
legislature from vetoing enacted initiatives or repealing them within two
years, while still allowing post-enactment legislative amendments.193
Additionally, substantially similar enactments by the legislature will void
a measure before it reaches the ballot at “the first statewide election held
more than one hundred twenty days after adjournment of the legislative
session following the filing.”194 The process for amending an initiative is
the same as for any other piece of legislation: after enactment, the
legislature is permitted to amend the measure at any time as long as the

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

465 P.3d 477 (Alaska 2020).
Id. at 490–91.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 492.
Id. at 493.
Id. at 499.
See supra Part II.
ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6.
ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 4.
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amendments do not “so vitiate” the intent of the initiative as to constitute
a repeal.195 But as discussed further below, an initiative may also be
voided before it reaches the ballot if the legislature enacts “substantially
similar” legislation before the election.196
The Election Code echoes these constitutional parameters: if certified
and properly filed, a ballot measure appears on the election ballot of the
first statewide general, special, special runoff, or primary election that is
held after a legislative session has convened and adjourned and a period
of 120 days has passed since that adjournment.197 This serves the dual
purpose of saving money on expensive special elections198 and giving
both the legislature and the public the opportunity to carefully consider a
measure before it goes to the ballot.199 As noted above, under the Alaska
Constitution, “[i]f, before the election, substantially the same measure has
been enacted, the petition is void.”200 Alaska Statutes section 15.45.210
echoes this provision by requiring the lieutenant governor, “with the
formal concurrence of the attorney general,” to determine if “an act of the
legislature that is substantially the same” as the initiative was enacted
between the petition filing and the election.201 If so, “the petition is void
and the lieutenant governor shall so notify the committee.”202
Warren v. Boucher203 is one of two leading cases on substantial
similarity between initiative bills and subsequent legislative enactments.
In Warren, the Court addressed for the first time “the process and
conditions, if any, by which enactments of the legislature can operate to
prevent an initiative from appearing on the ballot.”204 Warren involved
two pieces of legislation—one by initiative and one subsequently enacted
by the legislature—dealing with election campaigns and contributions.205
After the attorney general and lieutenant governor concluded that the
two measures were substantially similar, the lieutenant governor voided

195. Warren v. Thomas, 568 P.2d 400, 402 (Alaska 1977).
196. See infra notes 197–202 and accompanying text.
197. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.190 (2020).
198. See Starr v. Hagglund, 374 P.2d 316, 322 (Alaska 1962) (noting that the
Alaska Constitution’s drafters amended article XI, section 4 before adoption in
order to reduce costs associated with the special elections that the original
language would have required in some cases).
199. The lieutenant governor must hold statewide public hearings at least 30
days before the election at which a ballot measure is to appear. ALASKA STAT. §
15.45.195(a) (2020). The legislature also must hold at least one hearing on a
properly filed ballot measure within 30 days of convening the session preceding
the statewide election at which the measure is set to appear. Id. § 24.05.186 (2020).
200. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 4.
201. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.210 (2020).
202. Id.
203. 543 P.2d 731(Alaska 1975).
204. Id. at 732.
205. Id.
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the initiative petition and the initiative sponsors sued.206
The Warren initiative was entitled “[a]n Act relating to campaign
contributions, expenditures, and their limitations” and the legislative act
was entitled “[a]n Act relating to the election campaigns; and providing
for an effective date.”207 In agreeing with the State that the measure and
legislation were indeed substantially similar, and that therefore the
lieutenant governor was correct to void the petition, the Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that legislative enactment “treat[ed]
the same problem as that sought to be reached by the proposed initiative”
and that both “attempt[ed] to reach the same results, more effective
election campaigns.”208 The Court also clarified that substantial similarity
analysis is fact-sensitive, stating “[t]he words ‘substantial’ or
‘substantially’ are relative, inexact terms. Their meaning is quite
elusive . . . [and] [t]he meaning of such terms can be derived only be [sic]
reference to all the circumstances surrounding the context in which they
are used.”209 Recognizing that the framers did not want an unrestricted
initiative process, the Court reasoned, “[T]he term ‘substantially the same
measure’ must be viewed against the total structure contemplated in Art.
XI of our constitution in the matter of direct legislation.”210
The Court looked to the Constitutional Convention, concluding that
“the legislative act need not conform to the initiative in all respects, and
that the framers intended that the legislature should have some discretion
in deciding how far the legislative act should differ from the provisions
of the initiative.”211 With respect to how far the legislative act could go
before it was no longer substantially the same, the Court concluded that
the legislature’s discretion was “reasonably broad,” and that “[i]f in the
main the legislative act achieves the same general purpose as the
initiative” and “accomplishes that purpose by means or systems which
are fairly comparable” they are considered substantially similar.212 The
Court elaborated that “[i]t is not necessary that the two measures
correspond in minor particulars, or even as to all major features, if the
subject matter is necessarily complex or if it requires comprehensive
treatment.”213 And it held that “[t]he broader the reach of the subject
matter, the more latitude must be allowed the legislature to vary from the

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 734–35.
209. Id. at 736 (internal citation omitted) (citing Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry. Co. v. Kings Cty. Water Dist., 302 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1956)).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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particular features of the initiative.”214 Recently, the lieutenant governor
and attorney general relied on Warren to void an initiative petition
relating broadly to campaign finance, public official integrity, and good
governance after the legislature passed substantially the same measure.215
That decision was not challenged in court.216
The second main case on substantial similarity, decided some thirty
years after Warren, is State v. Trust the People,217 which, as discussed above,
also focuses on the scope of pre-election review of ballot measures.218
Trust the People also contains important language regarding the scope of
the legislature’s authority to amend ballot measures post-enactment.219
Trust the People centered on a ballot initiative “restricting the governor’s
power to temporarily appoint a United States Senator.”220 The Court
reversed the lieutenant governor’s decision to void the petition based on
a subsequent act of the legislature, concluding “that the principal purpose
of the initiative is to completely remove from the governor all power to
make temporary appointments to the office of United States senator,
while the effect of the legislation is to preserve in all cases the governor’s
power to make temporary appointments to that office.”221
In drawing their conclusion, the Court explicitly rejected the State’s
argument that the legislature’s power to amend an initiative postenactment was tantamount to its power to supplant the measure entirely
with substantially the same measure.222 Although the Court’s prior
caselaw “recognized that the legislature is vested with broad authority to
amend laws enacted by the people through the initiative process”223 and
its prior dicta could be “read to equate the two powers, they are not
equal.”224 The framers of the Constitution intended to give the legislature

214. Id.
215. 17AKGA & HB 44 Substantial Similarity Analysis, 2018 Op. Alaska Att’y
Gen. No. JU2017200579 (May 25, 2018).
216. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.240 (2020) (allowing persons aggrieved by any
determination made by the lieutenant governor under Alaska Statutes 15.45.010–
220 to seek judicial review within 30 days of receiving notice of the
determination).
217. 113 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2005).
218. See supra Section III.A.
219. Trust the People, 113 P.3d at 623.
220. Id. at 614.
221. Id. at 615.
222. Id. at 623 (“[T]he power to avoid an initiative by enacting legislation
should not be equated with the power to amend an initiative enacted by the
voters.”). It is worth noting that if an initiative petition is voiced by substantially
similar legislation, that legislation is not subject to the same two-year restriction
on repeal that an initiated version of the same bill would enjoy.
223. Warren v. Thomas, 568 P.2d 400, 402 (Alaska 1977) (citing Warren v.
Boucher, 543 P.2d 731, 737 (Alaska 1975)).
224. Trust the People, 113 P.3d at 623 (discussing Warren v. Boucher, 543 P.2d
731 (Alaska 1975)).
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“only the power to amend and not the power to destroy”225 a ballot
measure, and therefore, “even amendments to popularly-initiated
legislation must still ‘effectuate[] the intent of the electorate,’ and an
amendment that ‘so vitiates an act passed by initiative as to constitute its
repeal’ is not acceptable.”226
Accordingly, the “essential inquiry” with respect to the scope of the
legislature’s power to amend an initiative will be whether a given
legislative enactment “so vitiates” an initiative as to constitute its
repeal.227 Read together, the cases on this topic show that legislative
amendments to initiated legislation must be manifestly loyal to the intent
of the bill—and by inference that of the voters—who enacted it.

V. STATUTORY COMPLIANCE FOR BALLOT INITIATIVE SPONSORS
As discussed above, much of the constitutional process for ballot
initiatives is delineated in Article XI and associated caselaw.228 The
Constitution explicitly provides, however, that “additional procedures
for the initiative . . . may be prescribed by law.”229 The Alaska Election
Code230 elaborates on and implements the constitutional requirements of
sponsoring and enacting ballot initiatives.231 It is most useful for
practitioners to think of the process in three distinct phases: application
and certification; petition and signature gathering; and election and
enactment.
A.

The Application and Certification Phase

An initiative begins with an application and, of course, a proposed
bill. Article XI, section 2 of the Alaska Constitution provides:
An initiative . . . is proposed by an application containing the bill
to be initiated . . . . The application shall be signed by not less
than one hundred qualified voters as sponsors, and shall be filed
with the lieutenant governor. If he finds it in proper form he
shall so certify. Denial of certification shall be subject to judicial

225. Id. (quoting Boucher, 543 P.2d at 740 (Erwin, J., dissenting)).
226. Id. (internal citation omitted) (first quoting Thomas, 568 P.2d at 403, and
then quoting Boucher, 543 P.2d at 737).
227. Id.
228. See supra Part III.
229. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6.
230. ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.05.010–15.80.020 (2020).
231. See generally id. §§ 15.45.010–245 (setting forth all procedures related to the
initiative process).
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review.232
Alaska Statute section 15.45.030 requires the application to include:
(1) The proposed initiative bill; (2) the printed name, signature, address,
and numerical identifier of “not fewer than 100 qualified voters who will
serve as sponsors;”233 and (3) a designated initiative committee of three
sponsors who will represent the petitioners.234 Alaska Statute section
15.45.040 further requires an initiative bill to meet four requirements: (1)
the bill must be confined to one subject; (2) the subject of the bill must be
expressed in the title; (3) the bill must contain a specific enacting clause—
”Be it enacted by the People of the State of Alaska;” and (4) the bill cannot
contain subjects restricted by Alaska Statutes section 15.45.010 (the
statutory equivalent of the Constitution’s Article IX, section 7
restrictions).235 Because these requirements may be daunting to the
general public, the Alaska Division of Elections offers forms and
information for ballot measure applicants as well as a bank of prior
Attorney General Opinions, timelines, and the status of past and current
ballot measures.236
Once the sponsors file their application, the lieutenant governor has
sixty calendar days to review it and “either certify it or notify the initiative
committee of the grounds for denial.”237 Although there is no statutory or
constitutional requirement for the practice, the lieutenant governor
typically seeks published advice from the Attorney General about
whether to certify a ballot measure.238 Certification may be denied only
232. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 2.
233. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.030(2) (2020) (noting that the statute requires
each signature page to include a statement that the sponsors are qualified voters
who signed the application with the proposed bill attached); see also id. § 15.45.060
(observing that the qualified voters who subscribe to the application in support of
the proposed bill are designated as sponsors, and the initiative committee may
designate additional sponsors by notifying the lieutenant governor in writing).
234. Id. § 15.45.060.
235. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.010 (2020).
236. Initiative Petition Process, ALASKA DIV. OF ELECTIONS,
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/Core/initiativepetitionprocess.php (last
visited Sept. 15, 2020).
237. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.070 (2020) (noting that the Alaska Division of
Elections will verify the number of signatures on the application); see, e.g., Letter
from Gail Fenumiai, Director of the Alaska Division of Elections, to Kevin Meyer,
Lieutenant Governor of Alaska (Aug. 19, 2019),
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/petitions/19OGTX/19OGTX%20%20Application%20Signature%20Review%20Memo.pdf (providing an example
of the verification procedure for the number of signatures on an application).
238. See, e.g., 2019 Op. Alaska Att’y Gen. (Aug. 29),
http://www.law.state.ak.us/pdf/opinions/opinions_2019/19003_2019200578.pdf (recommending against certifying an elections reform ballot
measure on single subject grounds); 2019 Op. Alaska Att’y Gen. (Sept. 26),
http://www.law.state.ak.us/pdf/opinions/opinions_2019/19004_2019200644.pdf (recommending certification of a ballot measure creating an
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for three reasons: (1) the proposed bill “is not confined to one subject or
is otherwise not in the required form;” (2) “the application is not
substantially in the required form;” or (3) “there is an insufficient number
of qualified sponsors.”239 Once the lieutenant governor issues his decision
regarding certification, “any person aggrieved” by that decision has thirty
days to challenge it in superior court.240 The certification process is the
first major hurdle for sponsors and, as discussed in Parts III and IV, it is
where most initiative-based litigation occurs.241
B.

The Petition and Signature Gathering Phase

If initiative sponsors make a proper application and clear the first
major hurdle of certification, they move to the petition phase. While less
legally complex than certification, the petition phase can still bring
litigation and be a time-consuming and expensive stage of the process.
Article XI, section 3 of the Alaska Constitution provides:
After certification of the application, a petition containing a
summary of the subject matter shall be prepared by the
lieutenant governor for circulation by the sponsors. If signed by
qualified voters who are equal in number to at least ten percent
of those who voted in the preceding general election, who are
resident in at least three-fourths of the house districts of the
State, and who, in each of those house districts, are equal in
number to at least seven percent of those who voted in the
preceding general election in the house district, it may be filed
with the lieutenant governor.242
The Court has held that “nothing in the constitution says or implies
that the [signature] verification process tolls the time in which the
initiative is to be considered by the legislature and proceeds onto the

educational bill of rights for Alaska students).
239. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.080 (2020); see also 2017 Op. Alaska Att’y Gen. (Oct.
6),
http://www.law.state.ak.us/pdf/opinions/opinions_2017/17003_JU201720057
9.pdf (demonstrating how the Attorney General reviews compliance with the
constitutional initiative restrictions (including the single subject rule) to be part of
the “required form” of an initiative bill and checks the application for compliance
with the technical requirements of the statute).
240. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.240 (2020) (permitting judicial review of any
decision made by the lieutenant governor under § 15.45.010–220).
241. See supra Part III and Part IV.
242. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 3; see also ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.140(a) (2020)
(describing the requirements for the petition to the Alaska Lieutenant Governor);
supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting the signature distribution
requirement was made through a constitutional amendment in 2004).
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ballot (or is voided by legislative enactment of substantially the same
measure).”243 Further, “‘the signature-gathering requirement . . . serves
an important screening purpose’; it ‘ensures that only propositions with
significant public support are included on the ballot.’”244 This means that
once the requisite number of signatures is obtained and the petition is
filed, the time for the legislature to act to void the initiative begins to run.
The lieutenant governor’s office must verify the signatures on the filed
petition, but verification occurs while the legislative clock is running.
Alaska Statute 15.45.090(a) requires the lieutenant governor to
“prepare a sufficient number of sequentially numbered petitions to allow
full circulation throughout the state.”245 Each petition booklet must have
seven items: (1) a copy of the proposed bill; (2) an impartial summary of
the subject of the bill; (3) a statement of the minimum costs to the state
associated with certifying the measure (excluding legal costs); (4) a cost
estimate for the state’s implementation of the proposed law; (5) a
statement of warning to signers of the criminal penalties for fraudulent
signing; (6) sufficient space for the printed name, signature, numerical
identifier, and address of each signer; and (7) other specifications the
lieutenant governor may require to ensure proper handling and control
of petition booklets.246
The lieutenant governor is required to prepare a ballot title and
proposition, with the assistance of the attorney general.247 In practice, the
language for the ballot measure is typically included in the Attorney
General’s opinion recommending certification.248 Generally, this
language is similar if not identical to the language that subsequently
appears in the petition booklets and on the ballot itself.249 That is because
the Court has stated that if “the summary is deficient for the purposes of
the petition [it is also] deficient for the purposes of the ballot.”250 The
ballot title must “indicate the general subject of the proposition” in no

243. Yute Air Alaska, Inc. v. McAlpine, 698 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1985).
244. Planned Parenthood of Alaska v. Campbell, 232 P.3d 725, 729 (Alaska
2010) (first quoting Faipeas v. Municipality of Anchorage, 860 P.2d 1214, 1219
(Alaska 1993), and then quoting Citizens for Implementing Med. Marijuana v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 129 P.3d 898, 901 (Alaska 2006)).
245. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.090(a) (2020).
246. Id.
247. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.180 (2020).
248. See, e.g., 2013 Op. Alaska Att’y Gen. (June 20),
https://www.elections.alaska.gov/petitions/13MINW/13MINW-AG-Opinion6-20-13FINAL.pdf (demonstrating the attorney general’s role in overseeing the
language of initiatives in petition booklets and the ballot).
249. Compare id., with Ballot Measure 3: An Act to Increase Alaska’s Minimum
Wage (2014) (demonstrating nearly identical language from proposed language
by the attorney general’s office and the language of Ballot Measure 3).
250. Planned Parenthood of Alaska v. Campbell, 232 P.3d 725, 730 (Alaska
2010).
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more than twenty-five words, and the proposition “shall give a true and
impartial summary of the proposed law.”251 The summary has a word
limit of 50 words per section of the bill and must meet certain readability
requirements.252 The proposition must be worded on the ballot so that a
“yes” vote is a vote to enact the proposed law.253
Over the years, there has been some litigation on the second and
fourth statutory requirements of the petition: the sufficiency of the ballot
measure summary254 and the statement of costs to the State for
implementing the initiative.255 Litigants have had mixed success
overturning a summary or cost statement,256 and doing so is no easy task.
The Court has explained that “the basic purpose of the ballot summary is
to enable voters to reach an informed and intelligent decision on how to
cast their ballots.”257 A ballot summary should “be ‘complete enough to
convey an intelligible idea of the scope and import of the proposed law
and . . . ought to be free from any misleading tendency, whether of
amplification, of omission, or of fallacy.’”258 It “need not recite every detail
of the proposed measure”259 but if certain information would give voters
“‘serious grounds for reflection’ it is not a mere detail, and it must be
disclosed.”260
Still, the Court applies “a deferential standard of review for
challenges to the adequacy of a petition summary” and will uphold the
summary unless it “cannot reasonably conclude that it is impartial and
251. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.180(a) (2020).
252. Id. § 15.45.180(b).
253. Id.
254. Alaskans for Efficient Gov’t, Inc. v. State, 52 P.3d 732 (Alaska 2002).
255. Pebble Ltd. P’ship ex rel. Pebble Mines Corp. v. Parnell, 215 P.3d 1064
(Alaska 2009).
256. Compare id. at 1085 (upholding a cost statement that “provide[d] an
accurate estimate of the likely insignificant costs” of implementing an initiative
regulating discharge of toxic pollutants into state lands and waters), and id. at 1084
(holding the summary for an initiative regulating discharge of toxic pollutants
into state land and waters “was a fair, true, neutral, and impartial explanation of
the main features of the initiative’s contents”) (internal quotations omitted), and
Burgess v. Miller, 654 P.2d 273, 276 (Alaska 1982) (upholding a ballot measure
summary regarding fish and game usage because it was “neither misleading nor
inaccurate”), with Planned Parenthood of Alaska v. Campbell, 232 P.3d 725, 730
(Alaska 2010) (holding defective a ballot summary that failed to disclose criminal
penalties for doctors performing abortions under certain conditions), and Alaskans
for Efficient Gov’t, Inc., 52 P.3d at 735–36 (rejecting a ballot measure summary that
“failed to adequately describe the actual changes” intended by a ballot measure
to relocate the capital and “cast[]” the initiative’s purpose in an unnecessarily
negative light”).
257. Alaskans for Efficient Gov’t, Inc., 52 P.3d at 735–36.
258. Id. at 734 (quoting Burgess, 654 P.2d at 275).
259. Id. at 736.
260. Id. (quoting Gaines v. McCuen, 758 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Ark. 1988)).
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accurate.”261 The party challenging the summary “bear[s] the burden to
demonstrate that it is biased or misleading.”262
Similarly, the cost statement is given broad latitude. The statute
“merely requires an ‘estimate’ of the cost of implementing the proposed
law” and therefore “need not document every conceivable cost associated
with” its implementation.263 The Court will defer to State agency expertise
and uphold the State’s “reasonable conclusions” as to the costs of a ballot
measure’s fiscal impact on the State.264
Throughout any litigation surrounding the petition booklets,
circulators are gathering signatures to place the measure on the ballot.
Petition circulators are bound by three main statutory requirements: they
must (1) be United States citizens, (2) be 18 years of age or older, and (3)
be Alaska residents.265 Petition booklets must be circulated in person, and
there is a one-dollar-per-signature limit on payment to circulators, subject
to criminal penalties for violations.266 Under some circumstances, ballot
summaries found defective may be cured without having to gather new
signatures,267 but petitions may not be supplemented to compensate for
deficient signatures after the verification process.268 Sponsors have one
year to gather signatures from the date the lieutenant governor notified
them that booklets were ready for delivery.269 To meet the constitutional
and statutory signature thresholds and distribution requirements,
sponsors may obtain from the lieutenant governor the number of persons
who voted in the preceding general election.270 The lieutenant governor
typically provides this data in his letter certifying the application,
261. Pebble Ltd. P’ship ex rel. Pebble Mines Corp. , 215 P.3d at 1073 (citing Alaskans
for Efficient Gov’t, Inc., 52 P.3d at 735 (internal quotations omitted)).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1085.
264. Id.
265. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.105 (2020); see also Nader v. Brewer, 531 F.3d 1028
(9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1104 (2009) (striking down a similar state
resident circulator requirement on First Amendment grounds).
266. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.110 (2020).
267. See Planned Parenthood of Alaska v. Campbell, 232 P.3d 725, 734 (Alaska
2010) (holding that a defective summary did not require new signature gathering
after considering, on balance, “the nature and magnitude of the misleading
statement or omission, the likelihood and extent of petition-signer inadvertence,
the hardship to initiative sponsors that invalidating signatures would cause, and
the hardship to the initiative’s opponents that permitting the initiative to go
forward would cause”).
268. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.170 (2020) (repealing § 7, 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws
ch. 80 and allowing sponsors to submit a supplementary petition); see also Letter
from Kevin Meyer, Lieutenant Governor of Alaska, to Robin O. Brena (Oct. 15,
2019), http://www.elections.alaska.gov/petitions/19OGTX/19OGTX%20%20Sponsor%20Application%20letter.pdf (certifying that the total number of
gathered signatures is greater than the minimum required).
269. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.140 (2020).
270. Id. § 15.45.090(b).
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informing sponsors of the total number of signatures they must gather
from the requisite House districts.271
After gathering all requisite signatures, the sponsors file their
petition booklets with the lieutenant governor, who has 60 days to review
them and determine whether the petition was properly or improperly
filed.272 Unlike the certification process, which involves legal analysis, the
basis for determining that the petition was improperly filed is ministerial–
–the petition simply must contain sufficient valid signatures that meet the
constitutional and statutory distribution requirements.273
C.

The Election and Enactment Phase

After clearing application, certification, circulation, signaturegathering, and petition-filing, initiative sponsors have one final hurdle
before they can present their measure to the voters for enactment: As
discussed in Part III, they must wait out a legislative session, giving the
legislature the opportunity to enact substantially the same measure,
which would void the petition.274 With respect to initiative elections,
Article XI, section 4 of the Alaska Constitution provides:
An initiative petition may be filed at any time. The lieutenant
governor shall prepare a ballot title and proposition
summarizing the proposed law, and shall place them on the
ballot for the first statewide election held more than one
hundred twenty days after adjournment of the legislative
session following the filing. If, before the election, substantially
the same measure has been enacted, the petition is void.275
Although the petition may be filed at any time, sponsors only have
one year to file the petition booklets from the time the lieutenant governor

271. See, e.g., Letter from Kevin Meyer, Lieutenant Governor of Alaska, to
Robin O. Brena, supra note 268 (certifying that the signatures submitted were
those of qualified voters and informing the sponsors that the number of required
signatures is 28,501).
272. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.150 (2020).
273. Id. § 15.45.160 (2020); see, e.g., Letter from Byron Mallott, Lieutenant
Governor of Alaska, to Joseph Connors (Aug. 4, 2015),
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/petitions/13PCAF/13PCAF-Notice-ofProper-Filing.pdf (documenting the Lieutenant Governor’s verification of
signatures in a notice); Final Report of Weekly District Totals for 13PCAF, ALASKA
DIV. OF ELECTIONS (July 28, 2015),
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/petitions/13PCAF/13PCAF-District-TotalsReport.pdf (noting the number of required signatures per House district and the
number of obtained signatures per district).
274. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 4.
275. Id.
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notified the committee that they were ready for delivery.276 The timing
can be tricky––sponsors often try to file their petition booklets shortly
before the legislative session convenes so that they can maximize their
time to collect signatures in time to get the measure on the next statewide
election ballot,277 rather than filing at the end of session and having to wait
an additional year for another legislative session to convene and adjourn
before the proposition can appear on the ballot.278
If and after a full legislative session has passed without the
legislature enacting substantially the same measure, voters have their
chance to cast a ballot on the initiative. Article XI, section 6 of the Alaska
Constitution provides in relevant part:
If a majority of the votes cast on the proposition favor its
adoption, the initiated measure is enacted . . . . The lieutenant
governor shall certify the election returns. An initiated law
becomes effective ninety days after certification, is not subject to
veto, and may not be repealed by the legislature within two
years of its effective date. It may be amended at any time.279
Of the fifty-four ballot measures that have appeared on the ballot in
the sixty-one years since statehood, twenty-six have been voted down and
twenty-eight have been enacted.280 Starting in about 1974, at least one—
and, in 1998, five—ballot initiatives appeared on a statewide election
ballot during each election cycle.281 The frequency of use is a good
indicator that Alaska’s initiative process is accessible enough to allow for
the people’s fundamental right to direct democracy, and is constrained by
enough restrictions and safeguards to avoid overpopulating the ballot or
usurping the legislative process.

276. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.140 (2020).
277. See id. § 15.25.020 (2020) (noting that Alaska’s statewide primary election
occurs on the third Tuesday in August of even-numbered years); see also Initiative
Petition List, ALASKA DIV. OF ELECTIONS,
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/Core/initiativepetitionlist.php#13psum
(demonstrating the recent trend of ballot measures appearing on the general
election ballot in November as opposed to the primary election in August).
278. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.140 (2020) (noting how an initiative petition
may be filed at any time, but the sponsors only have exactly one year to file the
petition booklets from the time the lieutenant governor notified the committee
that they were ready for delivery or the petition will have no effect).
279. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6.
280. Initiative History, ALASKA DIV. OF ELECTIONS (June 24, 2019),
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/forms/H26.pdf#page=1.
281. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Alaska’s ballot measure process strikes a careful balance between
accessibility and restriction. The framers of the Alaska Constitution
believed that direct democracy was a fundamental right of the people.282
However, they also wanted to ensure that the people’s exercise of this
right did not encroach on the roles of the legislature or the judiciary, or
waste the State’s time or money on clearly unlawful measures.283
Almost every election cycle in Alaska brings new ballot
propositions. Recent and significant public policy changes—such as the
legalization of recreational marijuana284 and raising the minimum
wage285—might not have occurred but for the ballot initiative. Although
the initiative process from application to enactment is doubtlessly
tedious, costly, and burdensome for sponsors and for the State, care and
determination in engaging with that process have shown that direct
democracy can be an effective means of enacting legislation in Alaska.

282. ALASKA CONST. art. XI.
283. Id. § 6.
284. ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.010–900 (2020); see, e.g., Jason Brandeis, Ravin
Revisited: Alaska’s Historic Common Law Marijuana Rule at the Dawn of Legalization,
32 ALASKA L. REV. 309 (2015) (providing further historical context on Alaska’s
complex history of marijuana regulation).
285. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.065 (2020).

